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Abstract 
   This paper experimentally studies peer punishment under three alternative technologies. We 
find that the choice of peer punishment technology has a substantial impact on group 
performance. First, under a technology where at least two subjects in the group must agree 
before another group member can be punished, group cooperation and group net earnings are the 
highest. Second, outcomes are similar regardless of whether punishment choices are 
simultaneously or sequential. These results suggest that punishment is not perceived as a second-
order public good but is instead an emotional reaction unresponsive to changes in the strategic 
environment (JEL C91, C92, D23). 
Keywords: decentralized punishment, public goods, other-regarding preferences, team 
production, experiments. 
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    While peer punishment has been shown to increase group cooperation, there is still open debate 
on how group members endogenously enforce cooperative norms and on what motives other 
than self-interest drive individuals to punish. In this paper we address both topics by 
experimentally comparing alternative technologies of peer punishment.  
   Peer punishment is widespread in many field environments. The clothing company Diesel has 
been tremendously successful in building a strong work ethic among its employees by using 
merciless peer sanctioning (Stella, 1996).
1 To avoid excessive harvesting, fishing communities 
use several forms of peer punishment, including vandalism of boats and fishing nets or denying 
loans (Ostrom, 1996). Mining communities also use peer punishment such as social ostracism to 
discourage others from breaking strikes over working conditions (Francis, 1985). 
   While peer punishment in field contexts takes many forms, the experimental economic 
literature has focused on the very specific punishment technology where group members 
simultaneously choose if and how much to punish each member of the group without ever 
knowing the punishment choices of others and with unlimited discretionality on punishment 
choices (Ostrom et al., 1992, Fehr and Gaechter, 2000, 2002, Sefton et al., 2002, Bochet et al., 
2002, Masclet et al., 2003). Important implications have been drawn from this punishment 
structure, but there are several reasons to examine alternative peer punishment technologies. 
First, doing so provides a robustness check for existing studies. So far the only systematic 
exploration of the above peer punishment structure concerns changes in the relative cost of 
                                                 
1 In an interview the CEO of Diesel Renzo Rosso describes how he is welcoming the new employees: “Look, here 
all the doors are open to you. You can climb the ladder or change task as much as you wish. But watch out: if you do 
not show competence in what you do, they all will walk over you. It will not be me to throw you out, but your very 
own peers,” 
 Stella (1996), pp.24-26, (our translation) Civil servants in some public administrations have equally 





  1punishment (Carpenter, 2002, Andreoni et al., 2003, Putterman and Anderson, 2003). Our paper 
alters the structure of the technology along multiple dimensions.  Second, variations in the 
technology of peer punishment may affect group performance. For any given social norm, 
changing the punishment technology may lead to more or less group cooperation. If a manager 
can shape the way team members interact, it may be possible for the manager to increase total 
production without, or in alternative to, manipulating the workers’ social norms. Third, 
alternative peer punishment technologies may help to disentangle competing theoretical 
explanations regarding non-selfish motives to punish.  
   Our experiment includes three punishment technologies, “Baseline,” “Sequential” and 
“Consensual.” The Baseline technology implements a design similar to what is common in the 
literature. When agents are motivated purely by personal monetary earnings, there should be no 
punishment and complete free riding in all treatments. We know from previous studies that this 
is not an accurate description of experimental results but scholars have not yet settled on a single 
explanation. There can be different ways in which a norm of cooperation is enforced. 
   We consider two classes of motivations that generate distinct predictions about the pattern of 
punishment actions depending on whether the punishment choices take place simultaneously 
(Baseline) or sequentially (Sequential). On one hand, punishment could be an instrument that 
agents employ to achieve a desired distribution of earnings across group members. In that case, 
an “instrumental punisher” that is willing to punish a non-cooperator if no one else does, will 
happily free-ride on punishment if she knows that others will punish. On the other hand, 
punishment could be an expression of the emotional response to a norm violation that is 
independent of others group members punishment decisions. In this case, an “expressive 
  2punisher” that is willing to punish a non-cooperator, will punish equally in both the Baseline and 
Sequential treatments. In this study we find a considerable amount of expressive punishment. 
   Each individual may have norms, i.e. standards of behavior about how individual group 
members ought to behave in a given situation. Some neurological evidence suggests that 
sanctioning a norm violator may be a source of utility for the punisher (de Quervain et al., 2004). 
One issue is that a group may face multiple norms, possibly conflicting ones.
2 In the Baseline 
technology all requests to punish are carried out and the group outcome results from the mixed 
impact of all individual norms. In the Consensual technology requests to punish are carried out 
only when there is a minimum coalition of two agents that shares a norm, i.e. want to punish the 
same agent. In either case, norms are not imposed by the experimenter but are endogenously 
determined by the group members. To some extent, the Consensual technology resembles to a 
legal system where laws are chosen or enforced only through social agreement.
3
   We measure performance of a punishment technology by its impact on group cooperation 
levels and group net earnings. The latter considers group earnings minus the costs of giving and 
receiving punishment. Group cooperation is measured using voluntary contributions to the 
production of a public good. Among the three treatments studied, the Consensual treatment 
provides the highest level of group cooperation and the highest group net earnings. Compared to 
the treatment when agents are not able to punish, the baseline and sequential treatments 
improved the level of group cooperation but yielded lower group net earnings. This is similar to 
the situation of a workplace that offers a high nominal wage, but employees do not stay because 
of the conflicts between workers.  
                                                 
2 The two agents must agree on the target but can still disagree on the amount of the punishment. Consider forming a 
mixed team with civil servants and Diesel employees. 
3 A biblical rule: “One witness is not enough to convict a man accused of any crime or offense he may have 
committed. A matter must be established by the testimony of two or three witnesses.” (Deuteronomy 19:15) 
  3  The rest of the paper is outlined as follow. In Section I we describe the experimental design. In 
Section II we present the theoretical predictions. The results are presented in Section III, and the 
conclusions follow in Section IV. 
 
I. The Experimental Design 
A. Basic Design 
   Our design consists of a public good experiment with three treatments of differing punishment 
technologies.
4 There are N=20 participants in each session. In every period the participants are 
randomly partitioned into four groups of n=5 individuals. In all treatments subjects participate 
for twenty periods in a finitely repeated public good game with and without punishment 
opportunities. In the first ten periods there is no punishment opportunity while in the last ten 
periods there is. Punishment opportunities are structured in three different ways: Baseline, 
Consensual, and Sequential (Table 1). 
   In the Baseline treatment, once group members are informed about each members’ contribution 
to the public good, all punishment requests are simultaneously submitted. At a private cost of 
one token per punishment point, an agent can decrease the earnings of any other individual in her 
group by three tokens. In the case an agent receives punishment points from two or more agents, 
her earnings reduction is the cumulative effect of all requests. Punishment on a targeted agent is 
carried out irrespectively of the number of requests. This is a common protocol in the 
experimental literature, adopted for instance by Fehr and Gaechter (2000). 
   In the Consensual treatment, participants simultaneously place their punishment requests. If a 
subject is the target of the punishment request of just one other subject, that punishment request 
                                                 
4 The Instructions for the Consensual treatment can be found in Appendix B. The whole experiment was framed in 
neutral terms. 
  4is ignored. When at least two group members request to punish a subject, their punishment 
requests are carried out. Subjects are informed of the outcome of their requests. 
   Finally, requests to punish in the Sequential treatment are not placed simultaneously but in  
(n – 1) steps. All requests are carried out, but every participant considers punishing each one of 
the other (n – 1) group members in separate steps. In step one, a subject knows that the other  
(n – 2) group members will have the opportunity to punish this agent after her. In step two, a 
subject knows that one other group member has already had the opportunity to punish the same 
individual and also knows the cumulative amount of punishment already inflicted. And so on for 
the remaining steps. 
   The treatment without punishment opportunity serves as a control for the treatment with 
punishment opportunity. The same n subjects interact ten periods without punishment 
opportunities and then ten periods with the opportunity to punish.
5
B.  Payoffs 
   In the treatments without punishment, in each period each of the n subjects in a group receives 
an endowment of y tokens. A subject can either keep these tokens for herself or invest gi tokens 
(0 ≤ gi ≤ y) into a project. The decisions about gi are made simultaneously. The period monetary 
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1 π        ( 1 )  
where a is the marginal per capita return from a contribution to the public good,  1/n < a <1. The 
total payoff from the no–punishment condition is the sum of the period–payoffs, as given in (1), 
over all ten periods. Note that (1) implies that full free–riding (gi = 0) is a dominant strategy in 
                                                 
5 We run three additional sessions where the ten periods with punishment opportunities were placed before the ten 
periods without the punishment opportunity. These results are not reported here. 
  5the stage game. This follows from  = – 1 + a < 0. However, the group payoff   is 
maximized if each group member fully cooperates (g
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  The major difference between the no–punishment and the punishment conditions is the addition 
of a second decision stage after the Simultaneous contribution decision in each period. At the 
second stage, subjects are given the opportunity to punish each other after they are informed 
about the individual contribution of the other group members. Group member j can punish group 
member i by assigning so–called punishment points p
i
j to i. There are three different treatments 
for the part with punishment opportunities. 
   In the Baseline (Simultaneous) treatment for each punishment point assigned to i the first–stage 













i ∈{0,1,…,7}, and simultaneously with the other agents. 









the effectiveness of punishment function. For punishment points given to others, agent i’s payoff 








i is the cost of punishment. This design has the 




k) constant – and equal to 3 – in order 
not to alter the “price” of punishment.
6 The pecuniary payoff of subject i from both stages,  , 
can therefore be written as: 
i π
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6 The reason is to avoid confounding effects in the interpretation of results due to differential “pricing” of 
punishment. For the same reason we allowed period earnings of a subject to be negative. Not doing so would have 
increased the fine-to-fee ratio of the marginal punisher. In the experiment, negative period earnings where 
infrequent. When ignoring the punishment given to others, it amounts to 3.3% of the observations with punishment 
opportunities. Cumulative earnings were always positive. 
  6The total payoff from the punishment condition is the sum of the period–payoffs, as given in (2), 
over all ten periods. 
   In the Consensual treatment, punishment is Simultaneous and employs the same cost and 
effectiveness functions as before. However, an agent is punished only if at least two agents 
requested it. Hence, the payoff function for both stages is: 




k i i p c k K p e i K ) ( ) ( 1 π π    (3) 
where  . The function I(i,k) equals one when agent k requests to punish 
agent i, p






                                                
i
k >0, and equals zero otherwise. In practice, only a coalition of 40% of group members 
or larger is allowed to punish a member. Isolated requests to punish agent i have no effect and no 
cost is charged for that request. If the punishment request is not carried out then the requesting 
subject is informed about it and the targeted subject will not know of such request. 
   In the Sequential treatment the payoffs are given by (2) like in the Baseline treatment but the 









i} are broken down into (n–1) distinct steps where at step k agent i makes a single 
decision p
j(k)
i. The order of punishment decisions j(k) is random and such that within the period 
agent i has an opportunity to target all other agents in the group, {j(1),…, j(n-1)}={1,…, i-1, 
i+1,…,n}. After each step, there is an update on the cumulative punishment received by each 
agent in the group. 
C.  Parameters and Information Conditions 
      The experiment is conducted in a computerized laboratory where subjects anonymously 
interact with each other.
7 No subject is ever informed about the identity of the other group 
 
7 For conducting the experiments we used the experimental software “z-Tree” developed by Urs Fischbacher (1998). 
  7members. No communication among subjects was allowed. In all treatment conditions the 
endowment is given by y = 20, groups are of size n = 5, the marginal payoff of the public good is 
fixed at a = 0.4, and the number of participants in a session is N = 20. In each period subject i 
can assign up to seven punishment points pi
j to each group member j, with j ≠i irrespective of 
their first stage earnings. In all treatment conditions subjects are publicly informed that the 
condition lasts exactly for ten periods. When subjects play the no–punishment opportunity 
condition they know that a session consists of two conditions but do not know the rules for the 
second condition. After period ten of the first condition in a session, they are informed that there 
will be a “new experiment” and that this experiment will again last exactly for ten periods. They 
are also informed that the experiment will then be definitely finished.
8
   In the no–punishment conditions the payoff function (1) and the parameter values of y, n, N, 
and a are common knowledge. At the end of each period subjects in each group are informed 
about the total contribution Σgj to the project in their group. 
In the punishment conditions the payoff function (2) or (3), in addition to y, n, N, a, and the 
protocol of the punishment requests are common knowledge. Furthermore, after the contribution 
stage subjects are also informed about the whole vector of individual contributions in their 
group. To prevent the possibility of individual reputation formation across periods each subject’s 
own contribution is always listed in the first column of his or her computer screen and the 
remaining four subjects’ contributions are randomly listed in the second, third, fourth, or fifth 
column respectively. Thus, subject i does not have the information to construct a link between 
individual contributions of subject j across periods. Therefore, subject j cannot develop a 
reputation for a particular individual contribution behavior. This design feature also rules out that 
                                                 
8 Each condition was preceded by a trial period to familiarize the subjects with the software. 
  8i punishes j in period t for contribution decisions taken in period t’ < t. Subjects know their own 
punishment activities, the aggregate punishments imposed on them by the other group members, 
and the aggregate punishment imposed on other group members.
9
   In the Sequential punishment treatment subjects know the step where they are at and the 
cumulative aggregate punishment imposed on other group members up to the previous step. 
Hence, they receive more detailed information about punishment than in the Baseline treatment 
because they can see both the end-of-period sum and some disaggregated statistics about the 
individual components of this sum. However, they are not informed however about the amount 
of punishment they have personally received until the end of the period. In all treatments, 
subjects are also not informed about the individual punishment requests of the other group 
members. Both provisions are meant to prevent, as much as possible, a subject from using 
punishment to pay-back others for their requested punishments. 
 
II. Predictions 
   We outline the predictions for the experimental condition with punishment opportunities. In 
particular, we provide the intuition for the punishment stage predictions of three alternative 
models, canonical, expressive and instrumental. Appendix A  provides more details and the 
proofs. All predictions are made under the following assumptions: (a) one-shot interaction; (b) 
common knowledge about agents’ preferences; and (c) risk-neutrality. In the experiment the 
probability that an agent was re-matched with the same four people was less than 2 percent. 
Duffy and Ochs (2004) have shown that using a similar random matching protocol in an 
                                                 
9 This provision can make a difference when subjects do not know the preferences of others. When a subject can 
only observe the punishment points she gave or received (Fehr and Gaechter, 2000), learning about these 
preferences may be slower than here. In our setting, a subject can see if a social norm was enforced with respect to 
any other subject in her group. 
  9experiment of indefinite length does not induce cooperation levels higher than the one-shot 
prediction. 
   Consider the decision of agent i to punish agent j at the end of the contribution stage. Agent i 
knows the contribution levels, gk, of all agents, including agent j and must choose a number of 
punishment points p
j
i ∈{0, 1, 2, 3, …} where zero means no punishment. We assume that the 
utility function of agent i is the following: 
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i.  While first stage earnings depend on everybody’s contribution levels, gk, 
punishment cost depends on the points of punishment agent i has given to agent j, p
j
i. The 
punishment of agent j may increase the utility of agent i by vi.
10  
   The three models considered in this paper differ only in the utility from punishment, vi: 
•  Canonical, vi    =   0        ( 5 )  
•  Expressive, vi  =  vi (p
j
i)      (6) 
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We denote with  p
j
-i = the sum of the punishment points that others have given to agent 














-i) < 0. 
   If subjects apply the backward induction logic, the canonical equilibrium prediction in all three 
treatments is that all subjects will contribute nothing to the public good and will punish nothing. 
In fact, choosing p
j
i>0 is a monetary cost that does not generate any monetary benefit in a one-
shot interaction. 
                                                 
10 Note that the function vi can vary for a different target agent j, a different vector of first-stage contributions (g1, ..., 
gn), and a different effectiveness function e(p
j
i), which sets the fine-to-fee ratio. 
  10  To understand expressive and instrumental motives for punishment consider the example 
illustrated in Figure 1. Agent i‘s utility increases in the level of punishment given to agent j, vi′ > 
0, but the utility gain is smaller for higher punishment levels, vi′′ < 0. Punishment may well be 
positive but the actual number of punishment points chosen depends on the private cost of 
punishment: 
{}( { ) }
1
0,1,2,...








=      (8) 
As the following discussion focuses on a given target agent j, for simplicity we use  i p  instead of 
j
i p . Both models predict that increasing the cost of punishment c, lowers  i p . This “price effect” 
of punishment that has been found by several experimental studies (Carpenter, 2002, Andreoni et 
al., 2003, Putterman and Anderson, 2003). The basic difference between the two models is that 
what matters for an expressive agent i is only the punishment that she personally carries out, pi 
while an instrumental agent i equally values the punishment she gives and the punishment that 
others give. As a consequence, for an instrumental punisher,  i p is the “standalone punishment 
level” (when nobody else punishes, p-i =0) and is the upper bound to what she will do. The actual 
number of punishment points requested by an instrumental punisher rely upon strategic 
considerations based on what other agents choose in reference to agent j. On the contrary, for an 
expressive punisher  i p  is always the optimal choice.   
   An expressive punisher’s punishment choice is independent of any strategic considerations. In 
equilibrium all expressive punishers with  i p > 0 will request to punish agent j. Hence there may 
be multiple requests to punish agent j and the total punishment agent j is  ( )
j n
k kj ep
≠ ∑ . The 
  11expressive model predicts an equal total punishment for agent j under the Baseline or Sequential 
technologies, and less than or equal total punishment under the Consensual technology.  
   For an instrumental punisher the essential issue is the total impact on agent j, and she has no 
objections to others doing the “dirty job” of punishing. She actually prefers it because it saves 
her the punishment cost. This framework was adapted from the model that Varian (1994) 
developed for voluntary public good contributions. The equilibrium strategy in the Baseline 
technology is for the agent with the maximum standalone punishment level to request the 
punishment,  i p = max k≠j { k p }, and for all the other agents to free ride on the punishment. In 
the Consensual technology, two agents, one of these being the agent with the maximum 
standalone punishment level, will punish agent j in equilibrium.  The total punishment of agent j 
in the Consensual treatment will be less than or equal to the Baseline treatment. The equilibrium 
strategy in the Sequential technology depends on the order of move in the punishment phase. The 
intuition is as follow. Suppose everybody wants to punish agent j,  k p >0 for all k≠j. If agent i is 
the last mover and agent j has yet to be punished by other group members, than agent i will 
choose to punish with level  i p .  If another agent h is not the last mover, she will choose to 
punish agent j only if her standalone punishment level is much higher than agent i‘s,  h p >> i p . If 
agent h chooses to punish, agent i, the last mover, will not punish agent j. In equilibrium, when 
agents know the order of moves, punishment in the Sequential technology is carried out by only 
one agent and total punishment is less than or equal to that in the Baseline technology. While the 
expressive model predicts no punishment differences across steps with the Sequential 
technology, the instrumental model predicts that the burden of punishment falls disproportionally 
on the agent that moves last. 
 
  12III. Results 
   A total of 240 subjects were recruited among the general undergraduate student population of 
the University of Siena via ads posted around campus asking to email or call. No subject had 
participated in this type of experiment before, and each subject participated in only one of the 
experimental sessions. Twelve sessions were conducted between March and October 2003. Each 
session lasted between 1 hour and 50 minutes and 2 hours and 30 minutes. Payment was done 
privately in cash at the end of each session and totaled 12.40 euros per subject on average.
11
   The results are grouped into two sub-sections, one referring to aggregate cooperation and net 
payoff (Results 1-3) and one concerning individual decisions to punish (Results 4-7). 
 
A. Aggregate cooperation and surplus 
   When subjects have the opportunity to punish, contributions to the public good increase 
(Result 1) and stay high over time (Result 2). In addition to replicating these well known results, 
we also find sharp differences regarding group cooperation levels and group net earnings 
according to the punishment technology used. In particular, group cooperation (contribution) and 
group net earnings are highest in the Consensual treatment (Result 3).  
RESULT 1: The existence of punishment opportunities causes a rise in the average contribution 
level from 17% to 29% of the endowment. In particular, while the average contribution raises in 
all treatments, the rise is largest in the Consensual treatment.  
RESULT 2: In the no-punishment condition average contributions converge over time close to 
full free riding. In contrast, in the punishment condition average contributions are stable or 
                                                 
11   At the October 2003 rate of $1.17 per euro, it is equivalent to $14.50. This amount includes the show up fee that 
was 3 euros for the four sessions conducted before October and 5 euros afterwards. The amounts in the instruction 
were quoted in “Tokens”. A token was converted into 0.02 euros. 
  13increasing over time. In particular there is a steady growth in contribution levels in the 
Consensual treatment.  
   Support for Results 1 and 2 comes from Table 2 and Figure 2. Without a punishment 
opportunity the average individual contribution across all treatments is 3.31 tokens. This average 
value hides a declining trend from 5.92 tokens in period one to 1.82 in period ten, which is 
similar in the three treatments. When the opportunity to punish is introduced, the average 
individual contribution across periods and treatments with punishment is 5.77. A nonparametric 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test shows that this difference in contributions is significant at the one 
percent significance level (p=0.0061). In the first period, with punishment opportunities (period 
eleven), there is a “jump” in the average contribution to 5.21 tokens that grows over time to 6.50 
in period twenty. This jump in contribution between the last period without punishment and the 
first period with punishment is significant at a one percent level according to a Wilcoxon signed 
ranks test (p=0.0002). 
   Besides these common patterns, each punishment technology shows remarkable peculiarities. 
Overall contributions under a Consensual technology are substantially higher than in the other 
two (8.46 vs. 4.46 Baseline and 4.38 Sequential).
12 Moreover, while the time trend is increasing 
for the Consensual technology (period one-ten, 6.94-9.76), it is roughly stationary for the other 
two (4.01-5.65 Baseline, 4.62-4.10 Sequential). Such differences are summarized by the analysis 
of relative payoff gains with and without punishment in Result 3. 
RESULT 3: In all treatments punishment opportunities initially cause a relative payoff loss. The 
Consensual treatment is the only treatment in which relative payoff gains are found and this is 
only observed in the final four periods. In the final period of the Consensual treatment the 
                                                 
12 A non parametric Wilcoxon signed ranks test  shows that the difference in contributions with and without sanction 
opportunities between the Consensual treatment on one side and the other two treatments on the other side is 
significant at a ten percent level (p=0.0768).  
  14relative payoff gain is 13 percent. In the Baseline and Sequential treatments the relative payoff 
losses remain throughout all periods, although they become smaller over time. In the final period 
of the Baseline and Sequential treatments the relative payoff loss is roughly 20 percent.  
   Support for Result 3 comes from Table 2 and Figure 3. Normalizing the earnings in the final 
period of the no punishment condition to 100, then earnings in the first period with punishment 
are equal to 57 in the Baseline treatment, 53 in the Sequential, and 85 in the Consensual. By the 
end of the session, all of these values have increased. While the Baseline is at 80 and the 
Sequential is at 78, which are still below the reference value without punishment, the Consensual 
treatment is above, at 113. A Wilcoxon signed ranks test shows that the differences in group net 
earnings between the last period with and without sanction opportunities are significantly 
different in the Consensual treatment compared to the other two treatments at a five percent level 
(p=0.0364). 
   Hence, the Consensual punishment technology, by its ability to endogenously minimizing 
conflict while still maintaining incentives to cooperate, clearly dominates the Baseline and 
Sequential technologies in terms of group contribution levels and group net earnings. Let us 
define a punishment rate as the average number of punishment points assigned to a particular 
contribution action, () /
nn j
k jk j p n
≠ ∑∑  for Baseline and Sequential and 
for Consensual. The punishment rate was 1.70 in the Consensual 
compared to 2.47 in the other two treatments (Figure 4). This difference persists also after 
adjusting for the variations in group contribution across treatments (Table 3). For any given 
contribution level, lower punishment rates translate into a smaller deadweight loss. One reason 
for the lower punishment rate is that all punishment requests made by just one agent were 
() ( /
nn j
k jk j Kj p n
≠ ∑∑ )
  15ignored. Had those requests not been ignored, the punishment rate in the Consensual treatment 
would have been 29.5 percent higher (full sample, Figure 4). Interestingly, while less than one 
out of every ten requests to target full free-riders was censored, about three out of four attempts 
to punish strong cooperators with contributions (15,20] were blocked. The Consensual 
technology endogenously filtered out the anti-social norm of a minority that was targeting 
cooperators, thus enhancing the incentives to cooperate. The Baseline and Sequential technology 
instead allowed a minority to freely harm strong cooperators and hence group incentives for 
cooperation.  
   To provide additional statistical evidence for this explanation and to facilitate the comparison 
with Fehr and Gaechter (2000) we also present a regression analysis of punishment behavior. As 
a complement to the use of absolute contribution levels employed in Table 3, this analysis also 
captures the effect of punishment on subjects’ relative contributions in respect to the group 
average. Table 6 contains a model and an ordinary least-squared (OLS) regression where the 
dependent variable is “received punishment points” of a subject and the independent variables 
comprise “strong cooperator”, “others’ average contribution”, “positive deviation” and “absolute 
negative deviation”, respectively.  The latter variable is the absolute value of the actual deviation 
of a subject’s contribution from the others’ average in case that his or her own contribution is 
below the average. This variable is zero if the subject’s own contribution is equal or above the 
others’ average. The variable “positive deviation” is constructed analogously. The variable 
“strong cooperator” is one if the subject’s contribution is above fifteen tokens and zero 
otherwise. This variable retains the absolute scale of the contribution level and may capture the 
tendency, mentioned above, to target highly cooperative subjects. The model also includes 
period and session dummies. In all treatments, the coefficient of the “absolute negative 
  16deviation” is positive and significant at the one percent level. This result reinforces the 
conclusion that free riders can reduce the received punishment by increasing their contributions. 
Although the positive coefficient is not significant, in the Baseline and Sequential treatment, 
strong cooperators were targeted for punishment. However, in the Consensual treatment, strong 
cooperators were less likely to receive punishment (significant only at the 10 percent level). This 
result holds when controlling for the relative contribution with respect to the group. 
   What stands out in the analysis of group cooperation levels across treatments is the superiority 
of the Consensual technology. This technology realized a relative payoff gain through a 
contribution level 90 percent higher than the Baseline treatment and 10 percent lower 
punishment costs (Result 3). 
 
B. Motivations to punish 
   We now turn to a comparison of the patterns of individual punishment decisions with the 
predictions of the models of instrumental and expressive punishment (Results 4-7).   
RESULT 4: In the Baseline treatment, approximately half of the times that a subject is punished, 
two or more subjects have requested the punishment.  
   Support for Result 4 can be found in Table 4. Such a high frequency of multiple requests to 
punish the same actions can be better explained by a model of expressive punishment than by a 
model of instrumental punishment. We now discuss, within the model of instrumental 
punishment, possible reasons to expect multiple requests to punish the same agent. As none of 
them is explaining the magnitude of Result 4 while the model of expressive punishment does, we 
conclude that the latter model is more accurate. 
  17   Trembling hand. As a preliminary exercise, we consider the instance that the actual number of 
punishers is simply the outcome of money maximizing agents, as in the canonical model, with a 
tendency to make random mistakes in the decisions to punish or not any one of the other four 
agents. By chance there can be none, one, two, three, or four requests to punish an action, k. 
However, the empirical distribution over the frequency of punishment (Table 4) is statistically 
different from the distribution of draws from a binomial distribution. Assuming that punishment 








n-k, where n=4 and p is calibrated to fit 
the share of actions not punished (p=0.25 yields Pr{k=0}=0.316), predicts that many actions 
should be punished by just one agent, Pr{k=1}=0.42, substantially more than what one actually 
observes.
13 Moreover, if punishment choices were random one would not expect to find that free 
riders are a more frequent target than cooperators (Table 3). Hence, a trembling hand cannot 
explain the high frequency of punishments carried out by two or more agents. On the contrary, it 
reinforces the need for an alternative explanation. 
   Preferences for heavy punishment. There is an upper bound of seven punishment points that a 
single agent can request. A maximum request has a considerable impact on the earnings of an 
agent, namely a reduction between 40% and 105%.
14 Yet, if a subject wants to punish more, 
j
i p >7, and there is another similar punisher in her group, in equilibrium there are multiple 
requests to punish. Such an event can be fully ruled out only by removing the upper bound to 
                                                 
13 A nonparametric Chi-squared test shows that the predicted punishment events done by a binomial distribution 
with p=0.25 for the cases of  three and four (5.08%), two (21.09%), and one (31.64%) requests are different from the 
observed ones at all conventional significance levels (p<0.0001) for each one of the Baseline sessions. To carry out 
this test one must assume that each period yields an independent observation. 
14  Seven points of punishment reduces earnings by 21 tokens. If everybody free rides, gi=0 for all i=1,2,3,4 then 
=20. If one agent free rides, g 1





  18punishment in the experimental design. Given the design, one measure of the extent of the 
censoring occurred is the proportion of seven-point requests, which is a modest 5.5 percent 
(Figure 5). Moreover, the proportion of subjects whose cumulative punishment is above seven 
points is 8.2 percent (8.0 percent in the Sequential treatment). We conclude that the presence on 
an upper bound to individual requests to punish may explain only a small fraction of the 
multiplicity of punishment requests.  
   Ignorance of others’ willingness to punish. Consider a situation where agents differ in their 
standalone punishment level, 
j
i p . A subject knows her type and has a belief about the type 
distribution in the general population but does not exactly know who is currently in her group. 
This bayesian version of the game has some appeal, especially given the anonymity of the 
experimental setting.
15  A subject who believes that she is in the lower tail of the distribution will 
not request to punish while a subject who believes to be in the upper tail of the distribution may. 
This conjecture implies that multiple punishment requests toward the same subject would be 
relatively close in amount in comparison to the average punishment request across different 
subjects.









i|j]], where j is a targeted agent. 




i|j]], which suggests – 
contrary to this conjecture – that there is more diversity in the level of punishment among 
                                                 
15 Yet, one could argue that group members’ attitude toward punishment could reliably be inferred from the profile 
of contribution levels if cooperators tend to sanction more and tend to target free-riders. That could substantially 
reduce the uncertainty about others’ punishment preferences and hence the impact of this type of explanation for 
multiple requests to punish. 
16 As a side note, if a subject updates over time her distribution over population types as she observes other subjects’ 
punishment choices that might reduce the multiplicity of punishment requests over time. Any empirical statistics 
suffers from not having contribution conditions constant over time. Of all punishment decisions in the first half of 
Baseline sessions, about 42.3% were carried out by one request and this figure raises to 54.4% in the second half. 
  19multiple requests toward the same subject than among average punishment requests toward 
different subjects. 
   Multiple equilibria. The model of instrumental punishment has multiple Nash equilibria when 
the highest punishers have very similar preferences for punishment.
17 In some of these equilibria 
there are multiple punishment requests. In order to account for the high empirical frequency of 
this event, one has to assume that this rather peculiar situation is very common in the experiment. 
Namely, that the set of top punishers share not only a generic social norm that classifies behavior 
into punishable or not punishable but also agree on the exact amount of punishment that each 
action deserves and have a similar preference for enforcing that norm.
18  A possible way to test 
this conjecture is to look at the Sequential treatment, where the multiplicity of equilibria 
disappears and so a reduction in the multiplicity of punishment requests should be observed. This 
reduction should become more pronounced as the proportion of top punishers increases. The 
similarity between the empirical distributions of the number of punishment requests in the 
Sequential and Baseline treatments (Result 6) suggests that the multiplicity of equilibria 
explanation can be rejected.
 
RESULT 5: In the Consensual treatment, 44 percent of the times that a subject is targeted by 
punishment requests, the punishment is not carried out because only one subject requested the 
                                                 
17 See  the Appendix with the case with |M|>1, BAS 3I and  SEQ 2E. 
18 Suppose that these subjects have not yet developed a norm on how to coordinate while punishing and they 
randomize among possible equilibrium. A rough estimate suggests that around three quarters of the decisions to 
punish should fall in the situation above if the multiple equilibria explanation is calibrated using the data in Table 4. 
Given |M|=2 and a maximum 
j
i p =3 for all i, if subjects randomize uniformly across {0,1,2,3} punishment points, 
then there are 16 possible outcome (1 of no punishment, 6 of one request, 9 of two requests). We set to 100 the total 
of one or two requests to punish. Empirically 47.4% of actions have two requests. That requires that of all decisional 
situations where there is punishment, 75.8% are with |M|=2 as above and the other 24.2% are with |M|=1. 
Computations done for 
j
i p >3 yields a frequency higher than 75.8%. Correcting computations by including 
situations with |M|=3,4 will lower the 75.8% frequency but not substantially. 
  20punishment. A relatively high portion of the requests that are filtered out are directed at 
punishing cooperators.  
RESULT 6: In the Sequential treatment, about half of the times a subject is punished, two or 
more subjects have requested the punishment. The empirical distribution of requests for 
punishment is rather similar to the one in the Baseline treatment.  
   Support for Result 6 comes from Table 4. Any comparison between Sequential and Baseline 
distributions of request of punishment is only suggestive because it relies on the assumption of 
an identical underlying contribution pattern. There are differences between the two but the 
aggregate level of contributions with and without punishment have some similarities (Figure 2). 
If the multiple requests to punish originate on a failure to coordinate among subjects, and based 
on a conjecture that they may be somewhat comparable, one would have expected a substantial 
increase in punishment carried out by only one subject. Instead, there is only a very small 
increase. The persistence of such a high frequency of multiple requests to punish the same 
actions lends more support to a model of expressive punishment than to a model of instrumental 
punishment. 
RESULT 7: In the Sequential treatment, more punishment is requested in earlier steps than in 
later steps. More precisely, while the amounts requested by punishers are similar for all the 
steps, the frequency with which contribution choices are punished is higher in steps one and two 
than in steps three and four.  
As shown in Figure 6, there is almost 40% more punishment in step one than in step four, which 
is at odds with both the instrumental and expressive model of punishment.
19 The pattern of 
Figure 6 can be more clearly interpreted when seen as the product of two components, a time 
profile of frequencies and a time profile of amounts. The latter component records the step-by-
                                                 
19  See predictions SEQ 5I and SEQ 3E in Appendix. 
  21step average punishment points among punishers only. If a subject requests zero punishment that 
step, she is excluded from the computation of the time profile of amounts. The actual time profile 
of amounts is basically flat, i.e. when a subject decides to punish she chooses on average the 
same amount irrespective of the step. The driving force for the pattern in Figure 6 is the 
declining time profile of frequencies, i.e. the step-by-step average fraction of punishers on all 
subjects in the group. In each one of the Sequential sessions, more subjects actually request 
positive punishment in steps one and two than in steps three and four. 
   The declining time profile of frequencies contradicts both models, as the expressive 
punishment model predicts a flat profile while the instrumental punishment model predicts an 
increasing profile. 
   On the other hand, the flat time profile of amounts is exactly predicted by the expressive 
punishment model while under some assumptions it is compatible with the instrumental 
punishment model as well. While neither model fares perfectly, the distance between predictions 
and evidence is larger for the instrumental than for the expressive punishment model. 
   The predictions of the instrumental model rely on the assumption that agents take strategic 
considerations into account. If so, they should be able to backward induct and force the last agent 
to pay for punishing in the Sequential treatment. Let us consider a variation of the instrumental 
punishment model where agents are unable to backward induct. Such a model can accommodate 
the multiplicity of punishment requests in the Sequential treatment (Result 6) that was 
troublesome to explain when backward induction is assumed in that model. Regarding Result 7, 
this adjusted model correctly predicts a declining time profile of frequencies.
20 The flat time 
profile of punishment amounts, though, is a roadblock, as there is a prediction of a strictly 
declining pattern. 
                                                 
20 It actually predicts a steeper decline in punishment frequencies than the one observed. 
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IV. Conclusions 
   Our experimental study of peer punishment technologies leads to three major conclusions.  
   First, the specific rules that govern punishment interaction do influence group performance in 
the voluntary provision of a public good (Result 1). In all treatments each agent had a costly 
opportunity to decrease the earnings of others in the absence of any personal material benefit. 
While this study replicates and confirms the robustness of the qualitative results in the literature 
(Ostrom et al., 1992, Fehr and Gaechter, 2000, 2002, Bochet et al., 2002), it also points to the 
significant impact of the punishment technology employed. An important result is that when 
punishment can be carried out only with the agreement of a coalition of agents, the group 
performs better than when each individual has full discretionality on imposing punishment on 
other group members. We measure performance both in terms of group contribution and group 
net earnings. 
   Second, peer punishment is costly and has the potential to destroy more resources than it 
generates, hence it does not automatically benefit the group (Result 3). Given the increases in 
cooperation levels when the opportunity to punish is offered, one may conclude that peer 
punishment is an appealing solution to the free riding problem. However, unless we specify the 
institution that governs peer punishment, this solution can have severe drawbacks. We find that 
in two out of the three treatments, the ability to punish others actually lowers group net earnings. 
This loss is especially pronounced during the periods of transition directly after the opportunity 
to punish is provided.  
  23   In line with most of the experimental literature on punishment, this study did not reveal the 
identity of the punisher nor permit counter-punishments, hence preventing revenge. Allowing for 
it would have further exacerbated group conflict and brought up aspects of peer punishment that 
are detrimental for group performance (Nikiforakis, 2004; Masclet et al., 2004). Anthropological 
studies of societies without a judicial system have pointed to the danger of the spontaneous 
human tendency to engage in peer punishment (Lowie, 1970, p.400, Girard, 1977, p.16-22). Our 
findings provide indirect support for the role of a legal system in the administration of 
punishment. Legal systems restrict sanctioning to the violation of shared rules and censor 
individual attempts to punish socially virtuous actions, hence channeling agents’ punishment 
attitudes toward beneficial ends for society (Kosfeld and Riedl, 2004; Casari and Plott, 2003). 
More studies are needed to explore the behavioral foundations of punishment through legal 
systems. 
   Our third conclusion concerns the motivations that drive agents to punish. Two classes of 
motivations were considered, instrumental and expressive, and we find a considerable amount of 
evidence that supports the expressive punishment motivation. For an instrumental punisher the 
essential issue is the total punishment that an agent receives. She has no objections to others 
doing the “dirty job” of punishing; she actually prefers it because it saves her the punishment 
cost. For an expressive punisher, instead, it is the personal action of punishing that brings utility, 
regardless of others decision to punish. One could interpret it as an emotional response to a norm 
violation that involves no strategic considerations at all. 
   Without the expressive motivation to punish, it is difficult to explain the evidence of 
multiplicity of requests to punish the same action when the punishment choice is simultaneous 
(Result 4), and the evidence of its persistence when the punishment choice is sequential even 
  24though coordination should be easier (Result 6). Moreover, early movers in the sequential design 
do not free ride on the punishment costs by letting later movers enforce the social norm (Result 
7). These results are in line with the meta-analysis of Falk et al. (2001), where they find little 
evidence of strategic motifs behind punishment. Although more evidence is needed before 
reaching a firm conclusion on which class of models is the most accurate, this study suggests that 
subjects do not perceive punishment as a second-order public good and  that  when it comes to 
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  26Appendix A: Predictions 
 
   We outline predictions for the canonical model and for two classes of models, expressive and instrumental under 
the assumption of  a quasi-linear utility function (4).
21
A. Canonical Model 
   The game is Γ =(n, ({0,1,..,20}x{0,1,2,…}i)i∈n, (ui =   – c(p 1
i π
j
i)) i∈n). In all three treatment conditions the unique 
dominant strategy equilibrium is that all subjects will contribute nothing to the public good and will not punish in all 
periods. In fact, choosing p
j
i>0 is a monetary cost that does not generate any monetary benefit in a one-shot 
interaction. This is most transparent in the treatment without punishment. This condition consists of a sequence of 
ten (almost pure) one-shot games. In each one-shot game the agents’ dominant strategy is to free ride fully. In the 
treatments with punishment the situation is slightly more complicated because each one-shot game now consists of 
two stages. It is clear that a rational money maximizer will never punish at the second stage because this is costly for 
the agent. Since money maximizers will recognize that nobody will punish at the second stage, the existence of the 
punishment stage does not change the behavioral incentives at the first stage relative to the treatment without 
punishment. As a consequence, everybody will choose gi = 0 at stage one (Fehr and Gaechter, 2000).  
B.  Model of Expressive Punishment 
   The strength of agent i’s attitude toward the punishment of agent j is measured by the level of expressive 
punishment :  j
i p ˆ
{}





i p u p , max arg ˆ 1
,... 2 , 1 , 0
π
∈
=       ( 7 )  
When =0 agent  i behaves as a money maximizer (5). Agent i wants to punish agent j more than agent k does if 






i p p ˆ ˆ >
22
   For the expressive model, and later for the instrumental model, we present predictions only for the punishment 
decision and under the assumption that contribution decisions have already been taken. Except that for some 
examples of vi, general equilibrium predictions for the contribution and punishment game have not been worked out.  
The punishment game when all agents are expressive punishers is Γ =(n, ({0,1,2,…}i)i∈n,  
(ui =   – c(p 1
i π
j
i) – vi  (p
j
i)) i∈n) and the equilibrium outcome has the following features for the three treatments: 
                                                 
21 We assume an affine utility function. Notice that for simplicity there is no other-regardness attitude in the first 
stage.  
22 This definition, as all the discussion in this Section, is done in reference to a generic target agent j and not to the 
whole group. For this reason, we will sometimes drop the j subscript from expressions without fear of confusions. 
Notice that the number of points of punishment must be a non-negative integer. Regarding the vi specification, 
compacting others’ punishments into a single variable, p
j
-i, excludes preference types that considers how the 
punishment is carried out, i.e. some agents may be willing to punish only if others also do it, which may be relevant 
especially in the Sequential treatment. 
  27Pred
1E: The t of punishment is given by the sum of each agent’s expressive punishment, 
P*= j p ˆ . 
e Nash equilibrium (a dominant equilibrium). 
Pred
 tha der Baseline treatment.  Punishment is 
ue Nash equilibrium (a dominant equilibrium). 
Pred
hm
e punishment. There are no differences in punishment patterns 
here are no strategic considerations at all in punishment choices because agents’ best replies are 
inde d
s on 
ictions for the Baseline treatment: 




BAS 2E: All agents i with  i p ˆ >0 participate in the punishment.  j
BAS 3E: There trivially exists a uniqu
ictions for the Consensual treatment: 
CON 1E: There is equal or less punishment under Consensual n un
strictly less for preference profiles where only one agent i has i p ˆ >0.  j
CON 2E: There trivially exists a uniq
ictions for the Sequential treatment: 
SEQ 1E: The overall punis ent level P* is equal to the punishment assigned under Baseline treatment. 
SEQ 2E: All agents i with  i p ˆ >0 participate in th j
between the Baseline and Sequential treatments. 
SEQ 3E: First and last movers have on average the same burden of punishing. 
Proofs are trivial as t
pen ent of p
j
-i . 
C.  Model of Instrumental Punishment 
  This framework borrows many ideas and details from Varian (1994). The present study focuse preferences for 
punishment while Varian (1994) discusses preferences for public good contributions. When 
j
i p >0, agent i will 
punish agent j if nobody else does, meaning that she is willing to enforce, at least partially, a social norm at a pri
monetary co
vate 




i p , has already 
l d e
instrumental punishers Γ =(n, ({0,1,2,…}) , (u =   – c(p
j) – v (p
j, p
j )) ) are now computed. We assume that 
punished.
23
   The equilibrium strategies in the three experimenta esigns for the punishm nt game when all agents are 





i p  are common knowledge. Throughout the analysis we illustrate the equilibrium strategy for n=3, 4, 5 but 
the results can be easily extended to an arbitrarily large n. 
   First design: Baseline punishment.    When all agents simultaneously announce punishment requests, from the first 
order condition, ∂ui/pi=0, one can compute an agent’s best reply Bi(p-i). Sometime we will drop the superscript j for 
                                                 
23 Notice that 
j
i p = .  j
i p ˆ
  28the target agent to simplify notation. From vi′(pi + p-i)=c′, we obtain Bi(p-i)=  i p –p-i. When pi>0, we have Bi(p-
i)=max{0,  i p –p-i}.  
punishment game depe
   We assume that agents’ standalone punishment levels are common knowledge. The Nash equilibrium of the 
nds on the set of agents with the maximum punishing attitude, M={i≠n: maxk≠n{ k p } = i p
que and is 
}. 
There are two possible cases. When there is a single agent in the set, |M|=1, the equilibrium strategy is uni
a corner solution where the agent i who most like punishing punishes  i p  and all the others j≠i punish ze   W  
|M|>1, there are multiple Nash equilibria that all yield a unique aggregate amount of punishment. 
Nash equilibrium: {i M, p
ro. hen
∈ Σ i
k*:  i∈M pi
k*=
k
i   and for j M, p p ∉ ) 
For example when 
j
k*=0}   (9
1 p =6,  2 p =4,  3 p =1, 4 p =0, in equilibrium agent n receives 6 punishment points from agent 1 
and zero from the other agents. In summary, the equilibrium outcome has the following features: 
ui m level of punishm BAS 1I: The eq libriu ent is always uniquely set at P*= i p , where agent i has the maximum 
standalone punishment level 
BAS 2I: The burden of punishing falls on the subject(s) with the maximum s ndalone punishment level, p ta
here exist multiple Nash equilibria otherwise, |M|>1. 
 
Exa al and modeled by the 








-i), where αi = f (g1,.., gn). Assume that agent 3 never punishes, α3=0 
t 
*) and 
then finding an optimal contribution level, g3*=argmax{u3}. A positive contribution is optimal, u3(g3=0) < u3(g3=g’) 
i≥1, or 
i*≥0 
for i∈M and pj*=0 for j∉M. 
BAS 3I:There exists a unique Nash equilibrium when there is just one agent with a strictly maximum 
standalone level, |M|=1, and t
mple. Consider a game with n=3 agents where the punishment attitude is instrument
a
while agents 1 and 2 punish similarly and only when contributions are below a common threshold: for i=1,2 αi = 
{for j=1,2,3, j≠i, αi=γ>0 when gj < g’; αi=0, otherwise}. In the Nash equilibrium of the punishment game the amoun










i +  
p
j




-i, if gj < g’; and 0 otherwise}. One can work out the general 
equilibrium of the contribution and punishment game for agent 3 by plugging p
j
i* into u3 =  1








when e(γ) > (1-λ) g’. Given e(γ)=3γ and λ=0.4, there is an equilibrium with partial contribution at g*=10 when γ>2, 
g’=10 and an equilibrium with full contribution at g*=20 when γ>4, g’=20. The same logic applies to agents 1 and 
2. In a general equilibrium with positive contribution, ((g *, g *, g *), (p
1 2 3 *, p *, p *))=((g’,g’,g’), (0,0,0)). 




-i i ) = α ln (p
j




) can accommodate a variety of 
attitudes toward punishment. For instance a preference for equal shares, α = max{ 0, γ (1/n – g/G) } with γ
an aversion toward disadvantageous inequality,  αi = max{ 0, γi (gi – gj) } with γi≥0. One could also model anti-
social behavior, such as an aversion toward cooperators,  αi = max{ 0, γi (gj – gi) } with γi≥0, or a Falkinger-type 
  29punishment αi = max{ 0, γi (gj – G-j/n-1)} with γi>0 (Falkinger et al., 2000). We remain agnostic on what is the 
appropriate specification but stress the flexibility of the model chosen. 
 
   Second design: Consensual punishment. While the game comprises n players, for the Consensual design it is more 
useful to reason in terms of the number of agents s ≤ n with a strictly positive standalone punishment value, s=|{i: 
k
p >0}|. In this respect, we can classify group preference profiles for n=5 into five exhaustive classes, N  
esponding to s=0, 1, 2, 3, 4. When the profile is of class N
i s
corr  s agents  s, we consider a punishment game among just
because agents with  i p =0 have no effect on the equilibrium. The notation N0 identifies situations where  i p =0 ∀i,  




for s>1 and |M|=1, ∃i∈M: pi
p p j i , and so on. The Nash equilibrium of the
punishment game in  ual treatment is: 
{for
k
p -1, ∃ ∈n: p
k*=1, a
k*= i j j nd for ∀t∈n:t≠i,j, pt
k*=0; 




i p }  and for j∉M, pj
k*=0}           (10) 
   While the s= nts exhibit  0,1 case is trivial, few comments will be made on the two cases with s>1. When the s age
identical attitudes toward punishment,  i p pi ∀ > = 0 , there are multiple Nash equilibria that all yield a unique 





brium strategy must as well involve 
24 with th difference that now the equilibrium set for   Consensual rule is a subset of the 
equilibrium set for the Baseline rule. This latter point follows from the consideration that, in order for a sanction
be effective, at least two agents must request a positive amount of punishment.  
   When the s agents exhibit diverse attitudes toward punishment, the Nash equili
strictly positive punishment from at least two agents.  We now describe the Nash equilibrium set for the five classes 
of preference profiles. The outcome under N0 is trivial. Under N1 there is never punishment with a Consensual rule. 
Under N2 the best reply is Bi(p-i)=( i p –p-i ) for the agent with the highest standalone punishment  { } i p argmax i =  
k
and Bj(p-j)=1 for the other.  The unique Nash equilibrium is then ( i p –1, 1). The second agent j never prefers to 
ore punish more than one point because agent n is already punished m  than agent j’s standalone value, i p –1+pj 
                                                 
24 Due to the integer nature of pi, there is an exception in the  equilibrium when  p =1. In particular, two individuals 
give one punishment point each and hence agent k receives two points of punishment. 
  30> j p . Moreover, agent j always prefers one punishment point to zero because uj( , 1,  1
j π i p –1) > uj( , 0, 0). 1
j π
25 On 
the other hand, agent i’s punishment request will have an effect only when the other agent joins him in the 
punishment effort. As the second agent j never puts more than one point of punishment, agent i’s equilibrium 
strategy is to request  i p –1 points of punishment. 
   Under N3 and N4 there are multiple Nash equilibria. All Nash equilibria are characterized by a constant punishment 
level of agent n, P*= i p , where  { } i p argmax i
k
=  and pj*>0 for two and only two agents. The best reply for the 
agent or the agents i: i p = { } j j
p max  is Bi(p-i)=( i p –p-i ) and for just one of the other agents i: i p < { } j j
p max  is 
Bj(p-j)=1. In comparison with N2, there is the additional problem of coordinating among the s agents. For example 
when  1 p =6,  2 p =4,  3 p =1, in equilibrium agent n receives 6 punishment points; 5 points from agent 1 and one 
point from either agent 2 or agent 3. When there is miscoordination more than two agents may end up punishing. 
   In conclusion, there are three differences in outcome between the Baseline and the Consensual rules of 
punishment.  
CON 1I: Under Consensual rule there is equal or lower overall punishment level than under Baseline rule.  
CON 2I: While the burden of punishment can fall on just one agent under Baseline rule, it is always spread 
between two (or more) agents under Consensual rule.  
CON 3I: While with identical preferences for punishment the set of Nash equilibria is smaller under the 
Consensual rule, with diverse preferences it is larger.  
   Third design: Sequential punishment. We analyze the equilibrium strategies under the Sequential punishment 
separately for n=5 for each of the five classes of preference profiles. We assume that the identity of each agent at 
each step is known. The outcome under N0 is trivial. Under N1 the outcome is the same as under Baseline rule, i.e. 
P= 1 p . Under N2 consider the order of moves where agent 1 moves first and agent 2 second. This analysis has been 
adapted and expanded from the contribution of Varian (1994). The best reply of agent 1 can be derived from his 
indirect utility function: 
z1( , p 1
1 π 1) =  1
1 π  – p1 + v 1 (p1 + B2(p1))    (11) 
z1( , p 1
1 π 1) =  1
1 π  – p1 + v 1 (p1 + max{( 2 p –p1),  0})    (12) 
Let us consider two possible cases. When preferences are identical  i p pi ∀ = , agent 1 (the first mover) assigns 
zero points of punishment to agent k and agent 2 (the second mover) chooses  p .  The level of punishment P is the 
same as under Baseline rule. The difference is that now there is a unique Nash equilibrium where the second mover 
                                                 
25 This condition is equivalent to vj( i p ) – vj(0)> 1, which can be rewritten as vj( i p ) – vj( j p ) + vj( j p ) – vj(0)> 1. 
The condition is satisfied since vj( i p ) – vj( j p )>0 because vj is increasing and  i p > j p , and vj( j p ) – vj(0)> 1 
because  j p >0. 
  31always bears all the cost of punishing. Loosely speaking, the order of moves solves the coordination problem among 
agents, which is present under Baseline rule. 
When preferences are diverse, the outcome depends on the relative preferences for punishment of the two agents, 1 
and 2, and assume that agent 1 announces her punishment request first. Consider the case where agent 2 likes to 
punish the most,  2 p > 1 p . In this case the optimal strategy for agent 1 is to choose zero punishment. Now consider 
the case where agent 2 likes to punish the least. Agent 1’s optimal strategy is then to punish for the whole amount 
1 p  only if he likes to punish much more than agent 2 and to punish zero otherwise. More formally, the condition  
   z 1( 1
1 π , 0) < z1( ,  1
1 π 1 p )         ( 1 3 )  
reduces to ∆1 > 1 p where ∆1= v1( 1 p ) –v1( 2 p ). The intuition behind this strategy is that agent 1 chooses between 
not punishing, hence getting the preferred punishment level of agent 2, and fully paying for his preferred level of 
punishment, which is higher. He will punish if the additional utility of the higher punishment is worth the cost. On 
the other hand, when preferences are similar, ∆1 < 1 p , the optimal strategy is zero punishment as in the case of 
identical preferences.   
   Consider an example with the following utility function: 
ui ( , p 1
i π i, p-i) =   – p 1
i π i + αi ln(pi + p-i), with αi  >0    (14) 
The preference for punishment vi is increasing and concave, v′=αi/(pi + p-i) >0 and v′′= –αi/(pi + p-i)
2 <0. The 
standalone punishment level is i p =αi. The best reply function under Baseline rule is Bi(p-i)=max{0, αi –p-i}.  
Under Sequential rule the indirect utility function of the first mover when there are two agents is z1 ( , p 1




1 + v1(p1 + B2(p1)) =   – p 1
1 π 1 + α1 ln(p1 + max{0, α2 –p1}). Agent 1 as first mover does not punish when  α1=4, α2 
=2 but does punish when α1=6, α2 =2.  In general agent 1 punishes if ln(α1/α2)>1. 
  The equilibrium strategy under Sequential rule is characterized by the following: 
SEQ 1I: Under Sequential rule, the overall punishment level is on average equal or lower than under Baseline 
rule 
SEQ 2I: The punishment is carried out by only one agent 
SEQ 3I: On average the burden of punishing falls disproportionately on the punisher who moves last 
SEQ 4I: There exists a unique Nash equilibrium  
SEQ 5I: Predictions 1I-3I hold when agents know their own order of move but ignore other agents’ order of 
move. 
  32Appendix B: Instructions 
 
The following instructions were originally written in Italian. We document the instructions we 
used in the first part of the experiment, which were common to all treatments, and present the 
second part instructions for the Consensual treatment. The instructions for the Baseline and 
Sequential treatments were adapted accordingly. They are available upon request. 
   You are now taking part in an economic experiment on decision-making. If you read the following instructions 
carefully you can, depending on your decision, earn a considerable amount of money. 
During the experiment we shall not speak of Euros but rather of Tokens. During the experiment your entire earning 
will be calculated in Tokens. At the end of the experiment the total amount of tokens you have earned will be 
converted in Euros at the following rate 
1 Token  = 2 cent. Euro 
At the end of the experiment your earnings will be privately paid in cash. To the amount on your screen you must 
add 5 Euro as a lump sum participation fee. 
During the experiment you will not be asked to reveal your identity and your name will not be associated with the 
decisions you are going to take. Moreover, you are not allowed to talk or otherwise communicate with the other 
participants during the experiment. 
 This experiment is divided into two different parts. The following instructions are related to the first stage. The first 
stage consists of 10 periods. 
   Your earnings depend on your decision and on other four participants' decisions. The experiment participants will 
be randomly re–matched after each period and therefore it is highly likely that in each period you will interact with 
different people. You do not know the identity of the people with whom you interact. 
   At the beginning of each period each participant receives 20 points. You task is deciding how you would like to 
use these tokens. The other participants will face the same scenario. You have to decide how many points of the 20 
available you want to contribute to a project. For each point that you keep for yourself you earn an income of one 
Token. The points you have contributed to the project plus the points that all the other four persons have contributed 
are converted in a double quantity of Tokens, which will be evenly divided among these five persons. Therefore, 
after being doubled, you will receive one fifth of the Tokens contributed to the project. To sum up your income 
consists of two parts: 
Your income this period =  direct income               +   income from the project 
                                        =  (20 – your contribution     +   
1/5  x ((sum of yours’ and other four people’s 
             to the project)                          contribution to the project) x 2 ) 
 
   Each of the four persons will receive from the project the same amount that you will. For example, suppose the 
sum of the contributions of the five persons is overall 60 points. In this case each person receives from the project 
60x2/5=24 Tokens. Instead, if the total contribution to the project is 10 points, each of the five persons receives an 




Sum of the points contributed   0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90  100 
Income from the project for each of the 5 
persons  
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 
 
   For each point that you keep for yourself you earn an income of 1 Token. Supposing you contributed this point to 
the project instead, then the total contribution to the project would rise by one point. Your income from the project 
would rise by 1x2/5=0,4 Tokens. Your contribution to the project would also raise the incomes of other persons. 
More precisely, the other four persons will earn an additional 0.4 Tokens each, so that the overall income increase 
for you and the others would be of 2 Tokens. 
After everybody has completed his or her decision, you shall see your period income on the computer screen. 
Moreover, there will be presented the points contributed to the project by each one of the four persons that could 
contribute with you as well as their period income. The identity of these other people will change randomly each 
period. 
This procedure will be repeated 10 periods. 
Are there any questions? If you have questions during the experiment we kindly ask you to raise your hand and 
somebody will assist you in private. 
––––––––––––––––––––– 
   These are the instructions for the second and last part of the experiment. As before, the experiment consists of ten 
periods and in each period you have to make a decision about how many of the 20 tokens available to you. 
  Different than from before, each period is now composed of two phases, the first phase is identical to the procedure 
already described, while in the second phase you may choose to reduce the earnings of other people that have 
profited from the same project. 
In the first phase of a period, you have to make the same type of decision as the one in the sequence already 
described before, and that will here be repeated. 
   At the beginning of each period each participant receives 20 points. You task is deciding how you would like to 
use these tokens. The other participants will face the same scenario. You have to decide how many points of the 20 
available you want to contribute to a project. For each point that you keep for yourself you earn an income of one 
Token. The points you have contributed to the project plus the points that all the other four persons have contributed 
are converted in a double quantity of Tokens, which will be evenly divided among these five persons. Therefore, 
after being doubled, you will receive one fifth of the Tokens contributed to the project. To sum up your income 
consists of two parts: 
Your income for phase one =  direct income               +   income from the project 
                                          =  (20 – your contribution    +   
1/5  x ((sum of yours’ and other four people’s 
  34             to the project)                          contribution to the project) x 2 ) 
 
After everybody has completed their decision, you shall see on the computer screen the points contributed to the 
fund by every one of the four persons that could contribute with you as well as their period income. Your decision 
and result will be shown in the first column. The identity of these other people will change randomly each period. 
 
In the second phase of a period you can reduce or leave equal the income of each of the four persons that have 
profited from the same project. Conversely, the other persons can lower your earnings as well.  
Your decision is about distributing points to the other four persons. There is no way for you to know the identity of 
the other persons because they have been randomly selected every period among all participants. You have to 
choose a number of points for each person and you know only his/her contribution decision in the first phase of the 
period. If you do not want to change the earnings of a person choose 0. If you want to reduce the earnings of a 
person, you can distribute a number of points from 0 to 7. For each point distributed, the income in that particular 
person will be reduced by 3 (THREE) tokens. For the person distributing the point, each point costs 1 token. Your 
overall cost is equal to the sum of the points that you have distributed to each one of the other four persons. Your 
maximum cost for distributed points is then 28 tokens (7 tokens times 4 persons). Your cost is zero if you do not 
distribute points to anybody. 
   As it will now be explained, a request to distribute points is not always carried out. For each person, there are two 
cases. 
When ONLY YOU have requested to distribute points to a given person, your decision has no effect. In particular, 
there is no reduction in his/her income and no payment on your side for your request. In the opposite case, when 
BOTH YOU AND OTHERS have requested to distribute points to that same person, then your decision to distribute 
points is carried out. Requests by others to distribute points to that person will also be carried out. In other words, 
there have to be at least two requests to distribute one or more points to the same person in order to carry out a 
reduction of his/her income. It does not matter that the two requests are for distinct amounts. 
 
EXAMPLES. If you distribute 0 points to a person you do not change his/her income. Suppose you request to 
distribute 6 point to a person. Under some conditions this request does not have any effect, while under other 
conditions you reduce his/her income by 18 tokens (6x3). More precisely, if all the others distribute 0 points, your 
request will be ignored. This result will be signaled on the screen at the end of each period by the note “Points 
distributed? NO” in the column corresponding to the concerned person. On the contrary, if at the same time 
somebody else has distributed for instance 2 points to the same person, your request is carried out (an 18–token 
reduction) and you will be charged the fee of 6 tokens. In addition, the request of the other person will be carried 
out. The cumulated effect of the two requests is an overall income reduction of (6+2) x 3 = 24 tokens. This result is 
marked on the screen at the end of the period by the note “YES” in the column corresponding to the concern person. 
 
Your total income at the end of the period will be: 
  35 
Your period income = phase one income  – income reduction                  –    cost to distribute points 
     = phase one income  – (sum of received points)x 3   – (total points distributed). 
 
After everybody has completed their decision, you shall see on the computer screen the results for phase two. For 
each person you will learn the cumulative income reduction due to the points distributed. Individual requests to 
distribute points will remain confidential in order to preserve the anonymity of decisions. 
Are there any questions?
  36Screen shot 1: Project contribution decision, all treatments 
 
Screen shot 2: First phase results, all treatments 
 
  37Screen shot 3: Input screen for second phase, all treatments 
 
Screen shot 4: End of period results, Consensual treatment 
 
 
  38Table 1 – Treatment Conditions 
 Baseline  Consensual  Sequential 
Decisions to contribute are Simultaneous  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Decisions to punish are Simultaneous  Yes  Yes  No 
Punishment when only one agent requested it   Yes  No  Yes 
Number of sessions  4  4  4 
Total number of participants  80  80  80 
Periods without punishment opportunity  10  10  10 
Periods with punishment opportunity  10  10  10 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of individual contribution across experimental sessions 
Treatment  Baseline Consensual  Sequential 
Session date  3/27  10/15  10/17 10/23 5/22 9/16 10/16 10/21  4/14 10/16 10/20 10/22






















































  39Table 3: Punishment rates by individual level of contribution (Sub-sample) 
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Notes: To partially control for the uneven distribution of contribution levels across treatments, the table includes 
only the sub-sample of experimental data where group contribution was in [10, 40], which constitutes about 58% of 
the sample (1395/2400 obs.). 
 









Contribution choices not punished  32.1% 27.4% 66.3%
Of which: One request to punish  - - 26.3%
Contribution choices  punished 67.9% 72.6% 33.9%
Of which:  One request to punish  32.5% 35.8% -
                Two requests to punish  20.0% 23.1% 18.8%
                Three requests to punish  12.0% 11.1% 10.4%











Table  5: Variance decomposition of individual requests to punish – Baseline treatment 


















1 1.451  1.451 -  318 
2 3.462  1.023  2.439  188 
3 4.040  1.040  3.000  102 
4 4.421  0.861  3.560  29 
 
  41Table 6: Determinants of getting punished: regression results 
  Baseline Sequential  Consensual  All  treatments 
 
High cooperators   0.7999  0.2274  -0.8794  -0.1897 
     (contributions >15 tokens) (0.8858)  (0.5818) (0.3183)*  (0.3975) 
Average contribution of   -0.0945  -0.0172  0.0569  0.0025 
     others in the group  (0.1612)  (0.0358)  (0.0193)*  (0.0438) 
Positive deviation from   -0.0707  0.0018  -0.0006  -0.0223 
     average  (0.0648)  (0.0324)  (0.0134)  (0.0252) 
Absolute negative deviation  0.7871  0.6295  0.5688  0.6329 
     from average  (0.0768)***  (0.1142)**  (0.0434)***  (0.0538)*** 
Constant   1.5221  -0.6236  0.1575  1.0468 
 
 
(1.6952) (0.3496) (0.3700) (0.4299)** 
No. of observations  800  800  800  2400 
R-squared  0.39 0.41 0.57  0.45 
 
Notes: OLS estimator clustered by session. It includes session and period dummies, not reported. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       
  42Figure 1: Utility from punishment 
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Note: The utility vi that agent i enjoys from punishing agent j is increasing in the punishment level pi. The standalone 
punishment level  i p =2 is also equal to the optimal punishment level for an expressive punisher. 
 


























































































Note: Period by period difference between  sequence with sanction and without sanction 
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Figure 5: Empirical distribution of individual punishment requests 
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Figure 6: Sequential punishment step by step 
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